


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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *WEEKLY SUMMARY*

State Dept. review completed

DIA review  
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The invasion of northern Haiti by a group of 25 to 30 non-Communist exiles on 20 May was suppressed by government forces the next day, leaving President Duvalier in as strong a position as ever.

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### **FAR EAST**

Hanoi's delegation to the Paris talks is keeping attention focused on the demand for an unconditional cessation of US bombing as the indispensable first step before taking up other issues. The North Vietnamese vigorously refuted Ambassador Harriman's references to points of similarity in the positions of the two sides and accused the US of trying to divert the talks from the bombing issue. They also sought to increase pressure on the US for a unilateral concession by publicly expressing readiness to discuss a political settlement if the bombing is halted.

The North Vietnamese appear confident that the Paris talks provide an effective forum for this kind of propaganda warfare and they clearly intend to keep the conversations going indefinitely.

In South Vietnam the Communists' tactics are designed to support the delegation in Paris by projecting an impression that they hold the military initiative. For this purpose, they are relying primarily on a series of mortar and rocket attacks against allied installations throughout the country. Increased ground activity in the Khe Sanh and Da Nang areas, however, suggests preparations for a coordinated large-scale offensive in the northern provinces.

In Saigon, President Thieu and premier-designate Tran Van Huong are engaged in delicate negotiations to broaden the government's political base without provoking a dangerous reaction from senior military figures. Vice President Ky and the generals reportedly recognize that they were outmaneuvered by Thieu in the appointment of a new prime minister, but they probably will work behind the scenes to resist threats to their power and privileges.


The Chinese Communists continue to express displeasure over Hanoi's decision to enter talks with the US, but they have avoided any hints of reprisals, such as a reduction of their technical and material assistance to North Vietnam.

Despite shrill demands in Peking's propaganda for the purge of additional "traitors" in the domestic political struggle, there apparently have been no attempts to bring down new victims since the dramatic ouster of acting chief of staff Yang Cheng-wu in March. This suggests that forces advocating further purges either have been effectively blocked or that they are not ready to make their next move.

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## VIETNAM

North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris are settling in for what they clearly expect to be a long stay. They are conveying the impression that they are prepared for protracted discussions without the prospect of early agreement even on priority issues. The delegation has moved into new quarters, and gives every sign of intending to remain indefinitely, including the installation of extensive new communications equipment.

The North Vietnamese continue to hold to the unconditional cessation of US bombing and "all other acts of war" as the indispensable first step before the talks can move on to other issues. Even though there has been some escalation in the polemics attending exposition of the Communist stand, the North Vietnamese have refrained thus far from setting any time limit for US acceptance of their demand.

Ha Van Lau, the deputy head of the delegation, told a Japanese correspondent that even if the US refused to stop the bombings, "the talks will continue." He added that Hanoi believed the US attitude toward negotiations was strongly influenced by domestic political considerations and that the North Vietnamese did not really expect serious bargaining to begin until early August under the pressure of the US political conventions.

Earlier last week, North Vietnamese diplomat Mai Van Bo told a French newsman that, although Hanoi

had no intention of agreeing to any reciprocal action in return for a bombing halt, it was prepared to keep talking with the Americans so long as it appeared "useful." He specifically ruled out the return of American pilots or any other "gesture" which he said could be used to save American "face" on the reciprocity issue.

Hanoi spokesmen in other parts of the world are also saying that North Vietnam does not intend to break off the talks over the bombing issue. A visiting North Vietnamese delegate to Japan told his hosts last week that Hanoi will not break away from the Paris talks and is prepared to take a flexible attitude toward the negotiations. As an example of this intended flexibility, he cited his government's willingness to accept a phased withdrawal of US forces following successful peace talks, despite Hanoi's demands for "immediate" withdrawal.

### Chinese Resigned to Paris Talks

Despite increasing evidence of Communist China's displeasure with the Paris talks, official spokesmen in private discussions have pointed up Peking's inability to dissuade the North Vietnamese from negotiating. They have indicated that Peking has only limited room for maneuver at this stage and have emphasized that China will continue to support North Vietnam in its war effort.

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China probably estimates that any attempt to reduce material support, the only significant lever available to Peking, would not only hinder the Vietnamese war effort but would also undercut Chinese influence in Hanoi at a critical juncture.

Peking continues to avoid direct comment publicly on the Paris meetings, but Chinese spokesmen have repeatedly attacked the concept of negotiations in general as a "hoax" and a "fraud." Foreign Minister Chen Yi at a banquet on 18 May for a visiting Guinean-Malian delegation bitterly denounced the "US imperialist scheme of peddling the peace negotiations swindle" and called on the North Vietnamese "to increase their resolve to fight and win." Since Hanoi agreed to the talks on 3 April, posters in Peking supporting North Vietnam have been removed and daily small-scale pro-Vietnam parades and demonstrations have stopped.

#### The War in the South

Communist forces during the week combined increased activity in the Khe Sanh and Da Nang areas, possibly in preparation for a coordinated offensive in the northern provinces, with a series of mortar and rocket attacks against allied installations throughout the country. The rocket and mortar attacks were probably designed both for psychological impact and to restrict allied reaction forces. Camp Evans, the headquarters of the US 1st Air Cavalry Division, sustained the heaviest damage. Five helicopters were destroyed, 79 had moderate to

heavy damage, and 40 were lightly damaged.

The attacks probably also had the wider purpose of supporting North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris by contributing to an impression of continued Communist military initiative. It is not clear how far the Communists might wish to carry offensive action to punctuate this stage of the Paris talks, but they almost certainly intend at least to continue causing heavy allied casualties, particularly US.

In the Khe Sanh area, US patrols are again encountering stiff resistance from what are believed to be elements of the North Vietnamese 304th Division.

Elsewhere in Quang Tri Province, Communist main force units, including elements of two North Vietnamese divisions, threaten many vital allied positions and populated areas. Although some of these units suffered heavy casualties in recent fighting, all are either already back in combat or getting ready for it.

In central I Corps, allied forces conducted three major spoiling operations against enemy units preparing for a possible offensive from the southwest against Da Nang. The Communists, nonetheless, are continuing to add to their strength in the area. There are indications that the North Vietnamese 2nd Division is returning here, its normal area of operations, after probably being re-equipped. There are also tenuous signs that a newly infiltrated North Vietnamese regiment may also be in the area.

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Huong Forming New Cabinet

President Thieu accepted Premier Loc's resignation on 18 May and a few hours later named Tran Van Huong to succeed him. Huong had a brief and troubled tenure as premier in late 1964 and early 1965, when his effectiveness was limited by his own inflexibility, the opposition of the moderate Buddhists, and lack of support from a military establishment which itself was deeply divided. Huong is widely respected nevertheless, both because of his incorruptibility and his demonstrated willingness to devote himself fully to his responsibilities.

The new premier, with Thieu's blessing, is negotiating with representatives of South Vietnam's badly fractionalized political community in an effort to broaden the government's base, which under Loc had been limited mainly to technicians and military officers.

In view of long-standing animosities and rivalries among South Vietnamese politicians, Huong faces an up-hill task in putting together a new team.

Huong's appointment is not sitting well with Vice President Ky and the senior generals, who are reported to be miffed over Thieu's failure to consult with them. Of probably greater weight in their calculations is a fear that Thieu, working through Huong, is maneuvering to displace them from the vortex of power through a civilianization of the government. Having been outmaneuvered by Thieu, Ky and the generals appear to have resigned themselves to the change in government. They are likely to content themselves for the time being with a careful monitoring of the situation, working behind the scenes to limit the inroads Thieu and Huong can make into their power.

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CONFLICTS IN PEKING LEADERSHIP UNRESOLVED

Two months after the dramatic ouster of acting chief of staff Yang Cheng-wu, propaganda media in Peking are still demanding the purge of additional "degenerates" and "traitors." No moves to bring down new victims have been discernible in recent weeks, however, suggesting that the forces pushing for more purges either have been successfully

blocked or are not ready to make their move.

Regime accusations are tougher and shriller than any published since last summer. Charges against Liu Shao-chi and other opponents of the Cultural Revolution now emphasize that they are traitors and Kuomintang agents, possibly in

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preparation for applying legal sanctions to them.

For the third time in three weeks, Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao led a major leadership turnout in Peking on 20 May. It appears that hierarchic rankings have been static since late March. The new elite group around Mao--about 14 people--consists of six politburo standing committee members, three members of the Cultural Revolution Group and five drawn from the military and police. Contrary to previous practice these latter five are now ranked ahead of ordinary politburo members.

The most recent turnout marked the second anniversary of the 16 May 1966 central committee circular which gave Mao's case against politburo member Peng Chen and started the overt phase of the Cultural Revolution. The most inflammatory portions of this circular were republished, along with commentary supplied jointly by the editors of People's Daily, Red Flag, and Liberation Army Journal, which appears designed to encourage greater revolutionary activity by radical

elements. The joint article said that considerably more "destruction" of society will be necessary before "construction" can begin. It listed all the key "revisionists" brought down thus far in the Cultural Revolution except the extreme leftists who were expelled last fall and winter. Radical forces in the leadership may have decided to stop publicizing the sins of this group, who had been so closely associated with their militant policies.

Meanwhile violence continues to stall the establishment of Revolutionary Committees in the six remaining problem areas. Since mid-April, factional fighting has been on the upswing again in Kwangtung, where a committee was set up in February. At the same time, the acting chairman of Kwangtung's Provincial Revolutionary Committee--a radical who has been running Canton since the former head became chief of staff in Peking in March--has himself come under Red Guard poster attack. It is possible that the new chief of staff, who is reported to have returned briefly to Canton in mid-May, himself engineered the criticism of his acting successor.

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## COMMUNIST FORCES IN LAOS CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITIONS

Communist forces are concentrating on consolidating their hold over newly won territory.

They have launched an intensive sweep operation in a follow-up to their capture of the major government supply base at Nam Bac last January. The sweep has been aimed at eliminating friendly guerrilla teams that have harassed the enemy's lines of communication in recent years. There are continuing reports that the Communists are also trying harder than before to control the scattered villages that have been aiding the government's guerrillas. An excessive use of terrorism by the enemy may, however, prove counterproductive.

In the northeast, heavy US air strikes appear to have blunted, at least for the time being, the enemy offensive against the government guerrilla base at Na Khang. Although the capture of Na Khang would severely hamper government operations in the northeast and would put the finishing touches to the Communists' most successful dry season offensive in many years, it is far from certain that the Com-

munist forces are willing to sustain heavy losses to take it.

In the south, Communist forces are making further efforts to consolidate their control of the Sedone Valley, the scene of a major government development program over the past few years. The Communists are using both propaganda and terrorism to control a populace that has in the past proved friendly to the government. In some instances sympathetic groups have been given weapons and trained as local militia, but the majority of the people appear to be resisting close identification with the Communists. Pathet Lao cadre are making a special effort, however, to convince the fence-sitters that the government will not be able to re-establish itself in the valley.

The Communists evidently intend to maintain a substantial military presence in the northern part of the Bolovens Plateau. They continue to move supplies into the area via Route 23 and are establishing a medical facility for the many North Vietnamese troops still in the area.


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## LAOS



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**EUROPE**

Tensions are high in several countries of West and East Europe.

The French Government survived a vote of censure by 11 votes. The vote came after the government offered to negotiate directly with the unions to end the walkouts that have paralyzed the nation. Union leaders said they were ready to negotiate but presented sweeping demands. The powerful National Committee of French Employers, meanwhile, decided to oppose any bilateral agreement between the government and the unions that would increase wage costs.

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Moscow's heavy pressure on Czechoslovakia, now well into its third week, has had little visible effect on the leaders in Prague. Premier Kosygin, in Czechoslovakia for an extended stay, had two conferences with Czechoslovak leaders the past week. He may leave on the eve of the Czechoslovak party's central committee plenum opening 29 May and will probably try again to gain some commitment from Dubcek to moderate his regime's policies.

Soviet Defense Minister Grechko and some high Soviet brass spent five, presumably not very congenial, days in Prague before winning Czechoslovak agreement to participate in "fair-sized" Warsaw Pact maneuvers.

The pace of the political struggle in Warsaw has visibly slowed, in part because of the regime's nervousness over the situation in Czechoslovakia. There may also have been some pressure from Moscow to postpone any changes.

East Germany, to assert its independence, sovereignty and strength, may introduce additional controls over West German travel to West Berlin.

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## PRAGUE STILL PARRIES SOVIET PRESSURES

The virtually simultaneous arrival in Prague last Friday of Premier Kosygin and a high-level Soviet military delegation suggested Moscow had made an urgent and possibly climactic effort to check what it considered to be a deteriorating situation in Czechoslovakia.

The visits were the latest in a series of confrontations. Moscow presumably is now seeking more than the verbal assurances with which Prague has responded to earlier Soviet criticisms. While the leaders talked, Moscow maintained the psychological pressure by keeping most of its military units in place near the Czechoslovak borders. Reports in Soviet and Polish news media that a joint Soviet-Polish Warsaw Pact exercise took place in southern Poland were a belated Soviet attempt to explain the deployment of its troops to the Czechoslovak-Polish border.

The military delegation, headed by Minister of Defense Grechko, probably pressed Prague for evidence of its intention to continue cooperation with the Warsaw Pact and apparently got some relatively modest concessions. Czechoslovak Minister of Defense Dzur announced on 21 May that Prague would participate in "fair sized" maneuvers this summer. He added, however, that the maneuvers would not involve "big contingents" of troops. Dzur also stated that he would head a military delegation to the So-

viet Union, which suggests that the question of military cooperation is not yet completely settled.

There are no signs that Kosygin, who is scheduled to remain in Czechoslovakia until at least 28 May, and the Czechoslovak leaders are making much progress in their negotiations. A Czechoslovak spokesman said last week that the USSR is still considering Prague's request for a foreign currency credit equivalent to \$400-500 million. If the USSR withholds the credit or refuses to assure the continued supply of raw materials to Czechoslovakia, Prague's probes for economic aid from the West probably will be accelerated.

Kosygin is probably demanding that the Czechoslovak leaders suppress opposition to and criticism of the party. Thus far, the Czechoslovaks have held their ground.

Factional fighting within the Czechoslovak party may come to a climax during a central committee plenum which begins on 29 May. Liberals have added to their earlier pressure by calling upon the conservatives to resign voluntarily.

The party presidium reportedly has decided to recommend that an extraordinary congress be convened at which the liberals could move against the conservatives. Dubcek, however, will

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probably oppose the attempt by liberals to force the factional issue at the plenum, particularly because he is under Soviet pressure to rein them in.

The conservatives have recently been more outspoken in

criticizing the liberal trend, and there are no signs that they intend to resign. Diplomats in Prague believe the conservatives' strength has been underrated, and speculate that they will be maneuvering actively at the plenum.

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### FRENCH GOVERNMENT MOVES TO EASE TURMOIL

An estimated 7-8 million workers--about half of the industrial labor force--are on strike and rebellious students continue to occupy universities throughout France.

Premier Pompidou's midweek offer to hold a dialogue with the unions was immediately accepted and could be a breakthrough. In an effort to keep the university problem in the background and to concentrate on the more serious nationwide strike, the government had approved an amnesty for those involved in the student disturbances. A new outbreak occurred, however, when a disorderly student march flared into violence on 23 May. The march was called to protest the government's refusal to allow "new left" leader Cohn-Bendit to return to France following trips to Germany and Holland.

The dilemma the government now faces is to offer enough concessions to satisfy the workers without undermining the economy. The problem is complicated further by the Patronat, France's powerful association of factory owners and managers, which opposes major concessions to the unions and a direct government role in any negotiations. Occupation of factories by

workers and the tactical "alliance" of all the major unions against the government give labor a strong bargaining position. Strains between the Communist-controlled General Confederation of Labor and other unions have begun to appear, however, and the government may be able to exploit the disunity.

In offering to talk, the government took a significant step to ease the crisis. The workers do have legitimate economic grievances, but a deeper problem is the pervasive sense of being incapable of influencing both politics and economics. The coming dialogue at least gives the workers a direct channel to the powers that be, something they have lacked in recent years.

The government might couple its offer to talk with concessions calculated to defuse the crisis. There have been indications that cabinet changes are under consideration, although the timing of such changes is uncertain. Another possibility is a nationwide referendum. Given the depth of dissatisfaction over the government's economic and social policies, however, turning to the people is risky and De Gaulle would have to choose carefully what issues to place before them.

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## SOVIET GENERAL AFFIRMS FLEXIBLE RESPONSE MILITARY DOCTRINE

A senior Soviet general has affirmed flexible response as an important part of Soviet military doctrine. He has refuted Marshal Sokolovsky's famous treatise, Military Strategy, which holds that any future war between nuclear powers will inevitably escalate into a general nuclear conflict.

Colonel General M. Povaly, who is believed to be responsible for operational planning in the Soviet General Staff, recently told US military attachés in Moscow that the latest edition of Sokolovsky's book--published in November 1967--was obsolete and that US officials would be wasting their time reading it. At the high point of a distinguished career Marshal Sokolovsky served as Chief of the General Staff (1952-1960) and, until his death two weeks ago, was a member of the Inspector General Group of aged, semi-retired military leaders.

Povaly's charge probably is directed primarily at Sokolovsky's opinion that flexible response is not feasible. The initial period of a future war will be decisive, the marshal claimed in his book, and the Soviet Union will be able to detect preparations for a "surprise nuclear attack" and deal

the enemy a "crushing blow of decisive significance."

Povaly noted [redacted]

[redacted] that nuclear powers might not employ nuclear weapons in the beginning of a conflict or for some period thereafter. He endorsed the rationale of the US strategy of flexible response in a Red Star article printed last March. When a US attaché recently asked if the USSR's strategy resembled that of flexible response, Povaly replied, "Soviet strategy has no label, but the Soviet Union is ready to meet whatever the situation requires." His views seem more in line with predominant Soviet military thinking than do those of Sokolovsky.

The Soviet military leadership has given more attention to adapting its general purpose forces for use in limited conflict situations. The Soviet fleet is now operating in appreciable strength, with obvious political effect, in the Mediterranean. Besides showing the flag, it is capable of supporting very limited landing operations with its integral elements. Moreover, as the new AN-22 Cock transport aircraft comes into service, the Soviet Union will have an improved ability to move military forces to more distant areas.

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## RUMANIAN REGIME SOFT PEDALS DE GAULLE'S VISIT

President de Gaulle's "Europe for the Europeans" mission to Rumania from 14 to 18 May enhanced Bucharest's international prestige, but achieved little else. The tension in Eastern Europe probably induced some restraint and dampened the strident nationalism customarily expected of De Gaulle and Rumanian party and state chief Nicolae Ceausescu. De Gaulle left a day early because of the French domestic crisis.

In his speech to the Rumanian parliament, De Gaulle remarked that no European nation should submit to a "shameful effacement of national sovereignty" by being caught in a conflict between "two great powers confronting each other along a line which is exterior

to their own borders." Ceausescu did not rebuke De Gaulle for his statements, as Poland's Gomulka did last fall, but he "clarified" selected sensitive points later with accompanying reporters.

A bland communiqué at the visit's end skirted such touchy issues as the German question, the future of military blocs, and differing stands on the Middle East. Predictably, however, it stressed the "special" role of France and Rumania in promoting European detente and called for the establishment of a joint governmental commission to promote economic and technical-scientific cooperations. The two sides also agreed to a consular convention and to establish French libraries in Bucharest and Rumanian libraries in Paris.

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## POLISH PARTY STRUGGLE TEMPORARILY DORMANT

The pace of the intraparty struggle in Poland has slowed temporarily and neither of the contending factions has won a decisive victory. The infighting may break out again at a party plenum reportedly to be held within the next six weeks.

Since early May propaganda against "Zionists" and other internal enemies has been conducted in low key and purges appear to have fallen off. Students and other elements of the population have been quiet, with party leaders apparently giving only cursory public attention to the intraparty situation.

No decisive personnel or policy changes have occurred nor have shifts in government posts last month been followed by changes in the upper echelons of the party. Some changes may be announced at the forthcoming party plenum. Since March, however, purges of Jews and liberals have affected significant areas of the bureaucracy as well as academic and artistic life.

Anxiety over the future has caused indecision and delays at all levels of the party and state apparatus.

The regime's nervousness over the situation in Czechoslovakia, and possible Soviet pressure to postpone party changes in Warsaw, may have induced the truce, as well as the factions' fear of losing control over zealous activists.

This lull may help party boss Gomulka reassert his authority, but there is little likelihood he will regain his former pre-eminence. The impact of last year's Middle East crisis and of the student disturbances in March has shaken the Polish party, and imparted an irreversible impetus for change. The underlying forces of nationalism, economic dissatisfaction, and frustrated ambitions of the postwar generation have not been satisfied, and will have to be considered in any reconstruction of the party.

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## ITALIAN ELECTIONS RETAIN CENTER-LEFT GOVERNMENT

The Unified Socialist Party's losses in the 19-20 May elections seem likely to strengthen those in the party who favor a hard look at continued participation in the center-left government.

The party had hoped to win 100-110 seats and get back some 15 of the 24 seats held by the Moscow-oriented, Proletarian Socialist Party which opposes Socialist participation in the governing coalition. As it turned out, the Unified Socialists won 91 seats and pressures may develop to divide into new right and left wing Socialist parties.

No alternative to some form of Christian Democratic - Socialist coalition appears feasible, but the Socialists may delay a decision on joining the government until after their party congress next fall. They will, however, probably support or participate in a transitional government under Christian Democratic leadership for the intervening period.

The Christian Democrats won six additional seats and now hold 266 in the 630-seat parliament, and Premier Moro is the leading candidate to head a new

government. The small, left-center Republican Party, the third member of the coalition, increased its representation from five to nine. The parties to the right--Monarchists, Fascists, and Liberals--dropped from 74 seats to 61.

The Communist Party gained 11 seats for a total of 177 while the Proletarian Socialists lost only one seat to retain a strength of 23.

The strength of the far left, in part, is a result of the absence of any other major opposition to the government. In addition, the Communists evidently attracted the protest vote from youth voting for the first time.

Nevertheless, the Communists' hopes for an election outcome that would, at least mathematically, permit a coalition with the Proletarian Socialists, the Unified Socialists and the Republicans were not realized. The four left-of-center parties won a total of 300 Chamber of Deputies seats, 47.6 percent of the total.

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**MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA**

Much of the area is threatened with a serious locust plague this summer.

Swarms breeding in Saudi Arabia may invade Iran, Pakistan, India, Sudan, Egypt, the two Yemens, Ethiopia, and Somalia. A second dangerous breeding area is in eastern Africa. Unless controlled, the locusts will severely damage crops throughout the area. The result would be increased demands for emergency wheat shipments.

In the Arab-Israeli confrontation, President Hilu of Lebanon is finding it increasingly difficult to prevent Arab terrorists operating through Syria from transiting his country. If these infiltration activities increase, he fears Lebanon would be subject to Israeli counterattacks.

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In Africa, the fourth summit meeting of 14 East and Central African states ended on 15 May with a reaffirmation of "unflinching" African support for the liberation of southern Africa and an expression of hope for a peaceful solution of the Nigerian civil war.

The two combatants in the Nigerian war are scheduled to meet this week in Kampala, Uganda, but prospects for an early peace settlement remain gloomy.

Mali and Guinea may be trying to persuade Peking to finance and construct a 200-mile rail line to link the two countries. The arrival of the Guinean and Malian foreign ministers on an undisclosed "joint mission" in Peking on 18 May and a recent week-long visit by a Chinese economic delegation in Conakry lend substance to reports that the project is under active consideration.

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
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PERSIAN GULF FEDERATION AT THE CROSSROADS

The newly created Federation of Arab Emirates, which so far exists only on paper, is in serious danger of being merely an intellectual exercise, because of dissension among its members and hostility from Iran. A meeting of member rulers scheduled for 25 May should indicate if the federation has any practical future in its present form.

The widely heralded announcement that the federation would come into official existence on 30 March has proved misleading; the announcement is still the federation's only official act. Despite all the positive reasons for encouraging some form of union among the small Arab states in the Persian Gulf, the difficulties inherent in trying to form a



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cohesive and viable federation have so far proved unsurmountable.

The strongest opposition to the federation comes from Iran, which lays claim to Bahrain, one of the member states, as Iran irredenta. It also sees the union as another Arab puppet state, ripe for Egyptian domination. Iran regards Nasir as the greatest threat to its security in the gulf area. At the same time, both Nasir and Saudi Arabia's Faysal, two of the federation's strongest enthusiasts, have failed to take energetic steps to assist its development. Effective support from them has been keenly missed in the face of strong-arm Iranian diplomacy. Most of the federation members are close to Iran in terms of social and religious orientation as well as geography, and without strong Arab backing, their Arabism is apt to falter.

Within the membership of the federation, traditional divisiveness continues to erode the publicized union. This divisiveness stems from the differences of wealth among the states, the

varying degrees of political sophistication of their rulers, the orientation of their foreign relations, and a hodge-podge of traditional feuds and petty quarrels. The recent behavior of the ruler of Abu Dhabi in doling out millions of dollars in tribal gifts has encouraged the suspicion that he means to make the federation his own instrument. Bahrain, on the other hand, believes that the other rulers are far too friendly with Iran, whose territorial ambitions are regarded as the chief reason for Bahrain to seek safety in numbers.

This interplay of enmities so far has prevented any practical measures for implementing the federation. The rulers of the component states are scheduled to meet on 25 May to review this state of affairs. They will attempt to resolve their differences, but if their talks enable the federation to continue, even in name only, there may emerge a new form of federation, different perhaps in number of members as well as in organization.

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## NIGERIAN PEACE TALKS BEGIN IN UGANDA

On 23 May, federal and Biafran representatives were to begin peace talks in Kampala, Uganda. The talks are likely to be protracted and acrimonious. Biafra apparently believes that its rec-

ognition by four African countries has significantly strengthened its political position, whereas Lagos has virtually clinched a military victory in the civil war with the capture of Port Harcourt.

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The talks in Kampala must resolve procedural items left over from the preliminary talks in London before getting into the more crucial matters of a cease-fire and political settlement. Lagos is expected to insist that there be no chairman and reportedly also does not want any foreign observers at the talks.

The federal government, nevertheless, has been somewhat susceptible to international pressures and could choose to be more forthcoming on procedural matters now that its key military objective of recent weeks--Port Harcourt--has been captured. Lagos, however, will not yield on its substantive position that before a cease-fire can take effect Biafra must renounce secession and accept the 12-state federal structure.

The Federal Military Government has named a negotiating team of 17 delegates and advisers headed by Information Minister Enahoro, who conducted the earlier talks in London. The federal group includes a number of minority tribesmen, as well as one Ibo from the former Eastern region. The Biafrans are sending five delegates, including Sir Louis Mbanefo, who also was at London, and Dr. Okpara, top political adviser to Ojukwu.


Nigeria's ruling Supreme Military Council has reportedly endorsed the recommendation of army field commanders to continue military operations until the

Biafran army is destroyed or capitulates. Ojukwu, however, in two recent speeches has exhorted the Ibos to fight on, even from the forests if necessary, and the civil war may well continue for a long time. In the wake of the federal capture of Port Harcourt, Biafran forces are disorganized. Federal troops on the other hand are well equipped and supplied and appear to have adequate leadership.

Biafra may be continuing its air shuttle service by using another airfield farther north now that it cannot use Port Harcourt. Unless sizable quantities of new supplies can be brought in, the Biafra military effort will begin to collapse and could degenerate in time into protracted guerrilla warfare, particularly in the absence of a political settlement acceptable to the Ibos.

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SOUTHEASTERN NIGERIA



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## INDIA'S CONGRESS PARTY REVIVING AT THE POLLS

The Congress Party, after more than a year of reaping the bitter fruits of the 1967 general elections, has made some progress at the polls, but still faces many obstacles in regaining the substantial ground it lost in many of the states.

Last week's victory by Congress in the Haryana state assembly elections, the first state-wide polling since the general elections, capped a series of favorable electoral bouts for the party. In Communist-dominated Kerala, Congress recently made substantial advances in a series of municipal elections, and in Rajasthan the party dealt a strong blow to the conservative Swatantra party in two prestigious by-elections.


These limited triumphs should boost Congress morale as it prepares for what promises to be bitterly fought midterm elections in the much larger and more important states of Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal later this year. There is bound to be a measure of bandwagon effect, but local issues will be decisive in these elections. In both states factionalism continues to hurt the party. As in Haryana, however, voters in Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal have suffered the chastening experience of inept rule by non-Congress coalitions. This factor is bound to work to the Congress Party's advantage.

Meanwhile, the party is having considerable trouble with the highly unstable political situation that has evolved in several other states. At the heart of the problem is the difficulty in maintaining stable majorities. The Congress precedent in Haryana of denying a place on the party slate to defectors may alleviate this problem, but is unlikely to cure it. At least three more non-Congress governments are approaching the brink of dissolution, but Congress units in these states are in no position to take over.

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### INDIA



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## ELECTION OUTLOOK IN TURKEY

The Turkish electorate goes to the polls on 2 June to fill 52 of the 183 seats in the senate, five vacancies in the lower house, and all municipal and local government posts. As the pre-election campaign enters its final week, the incumbent Justice Party (JP) appears almost certain to capture as much as 55-60 percent of the popular vote and most of the contested parliamentary seats. Moreover, initial reports from several key areas suggest that the JP probably will win a majority of the municipal contests.

The campaign thus far has focused primarily on general party orientation and on personalities rather than on current issues. Religious reactionism--a perennial charge against the JP--economic development, and the left-right confrontation, however, have been the subject of partisan propaganda. Anti-Americanism per se has not been a major issue but is being exploited by the leftist Turkish Labor Party (TLP).

There have been few surprises in the campaign; however, unexpected cleavages appeared in the JP during the earlier party primaries. These have been glossed over during the ensuing campaign. The governing JP shows every sign of being confident of victory, but over-confidence could cost it votes. The relatively mediocre performance of parliament during the past two years does not seem to be an issue with the electorate which is more impressed by the country's general economic progress in recent years. The JP in its campaign has come out more openly against the TLP, accusing it of being crypto-Communist.

The major opposition Republican Peoples Party (RPP), led by octogenarian Ismet Inonu, expects to gain little from the election. The party lost many of its supporters among the landed gentry to the new Reliance Party which was organized following the RPP split between moderates and the left-of-center faction last spring. If the RPP receives less than 30 percent of the popular vote, Bulent Ecivet, party secretary general and head of the left-of-center faction, may be ousted in favor of a more conservative leader.

The conservative Reliance Party, headed by Turhan Feyzioglu, has had little time to organize nationally and is generally regarded as too middle-of-the-road to attract much popular support.

The Marxist TLP, on the other hand, is expected to do well in gaining popular votes, but probably will not add to its 15 seats in parliament. During the past three years, the TLP has been bolstering its nationwide organization and has succeeded in attracting some of the more leftist members of the RPP.

Should the JP win more than 57-58 percent of the popular vote Prime Minister Demirel's moderate position within the party will be strengthened, and the JP will have more confidence in implementing its program. A larger majority could lead to increased pressure within the party to muzzle the extreme left. An overwhelming majority could also result in opposition attempts to undermine, through propaganda and rumor, the good working relationship between the JP and the military in an attempt to cause the downfall of the regime which largely represents the old Democratic Party ousted by the military revolution in 1960.

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### **WESTERN HEMISPHERE**

The hemisphere's most dramatic event of the week occurred in Haiti, where a small, non-Communist Haitian exile force staged an unsuccessful invasion attempt on 20 May that was squelched within two days. Another bloody purge of Haitians suspected of working against Duvalier seems inevitable.

Chances for avoiding a violent political showdown in Panama remained rather poor even though National Guard Commandant Vallarino decided not to obstruct the certification of an evidently decisive victory by Arnulfo Arias in the presidential elections on 12 May. Public announcement of the official results of the balloting has been delayed, however, while backers of government candidate David Samudio seek through voting officials under their control to get their man declared the winner.

Electoral developments in other countries of the hemisphere are proceeding more routinely. The Dominican municipal elections on 16 May were accomplished quietly, with mixed results that could be hailed by each political faction as a "victory" for its own cause. Bermuda's first legislative elections as an autonomous political entity were won by the predominantly white pro-British United Bermuda Party on 22 May. Preparations for Ecuador's presidential election on 2 June continued to go forward relatively calmly, amidst growing indications that a rather tight race is developing among the top three candidates.

Political tension climbed in Argentina last week as a result of indications that a showdown between President Ongania and his military critics, headed by army chief Julio Alsogaray, was imminent. A misstep by either Ongania or Alsogaray could provoke an open clash, in which the President would probably come out on top.

In Chile, President Frei's annual state of the nation address to Congress on 21 May was boycotted by legislators of all five leftist parties because of violence that had erupted between government forces and striking teachers the previous day. His speech contained an appeal for action on his reform program that he seems unlikely to get—precisely because of the excessive political partisanship he denounced during his address.

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## OUTCOME OF PANAMA'S ELECTION STILL UNCERTAIN

The official counting of ballots to determine the winner of the presidential and legislative elections on 12 May continues amid confusion, government efforts to delay the process, and charges of electoral fraud by both sides. Although the government-supported Samudio forces are still trying to rig the returns, National Guard Commandant Vallarino is no longer supporting the official candidate and is ignoring orders from the Robles government.

counting the votes and proclaiming the winner.

Although the board is weighted in Arias' favor, the US ambassador expects the government to try to keep it from declaring Arias president-elect. While the board is legally authorized to grant credentials to the winner, the government-controlled Electoral Tribunal can nullify the board's findings. Any attempt by the government to annul the board's decision and call for new elections, however, would hinge on the position taken by Vallarino. His agreement with Arias puts the pro-Samudio forces in a weak position to enforce its claims.

Explosions, sniper fire, and terrorism are creating a mood of growing tension. Serious violence erupted again in Panama City on 23 May when Samudio toughs touched off disorders near the building where the elections board has been conducting its count. Twenty-two persons were injured during the ensuing gun battle.

Meanwhile, irresponsible news media on both sides are adding fuel to the fire. A rabble-rousing pro-Samudio tabloid, headlining its story "Samudio or Chaos," reported the formation of a popular militia to kill "oligarchs" and their children and burn their houses if Samudio is defeated. As the contested election continues unresolved, the potential for violence grows.

In a communiqué issued on 17 May, Vallarino emphasized the unity of the guard and intimated acceptance of the decisions of the National Elections Board, which is legally charged with

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## HAITIAN EXILE INVASION FAILS

The invasion of northern Haiti by a group of 25 to 30 non-Communist exiles on 20 May was suppressed by government forces the next day, leaving President Duvalier in as strong a position as ever.

After an ineffectual aerial bombing of the National Palace in Port-au-Prince, the invaders captured the airfield at Cap-Haitien and took the military commander of the north prisoner. Their plan to bring in a second group of approximately 100 men from the launching point in the Bahamas was frustrated, however, by the government's recapture of the field the following morning. The invasion leaders--who had been involved in prior attempts in 1963 and 1964--reportedly escaped. Some 18 of the other insurgents also remain at large and there may be skirmishes as military units and militia attempt to track them down.

The invasion was sponsored by the Haitian Coalition--a non-Communist Haitian exile group based in New York. The invasion failed because of inadequate organization on the part of the exile group, which was not able to reinforce or resupply the invaders. The exiles also mis-

judged the capability and loyalty of Duvalier's security forces as well as the extent of popular support that would be forthcoming.

Duvalier reacted calmly and confidently. He dispatched approximately 200 of his most effective tactical troops to the area under the leadership of the [redacted] capable Lt. Col. Franck Romain. Romain distinguished himself in a campaign against a group of invaders in 1964. The secret police immediately began to arrest all potential government opponents as well as relatives of the invaders. Duvalier deliberately kept news of the invasion from the public until the situation was well under control.

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The invasion attempt is likely to reinforce Duvalier's underlying bitterness and antagonism toward the United States. He appears convinced that the US was involved in the plans and suggested as much in a note to the UN on 22 May requesting a special meeting of the Security Council. He protested anti-Haitian propaganda by American news media and the alleged presence of US "warships" in the area. [redacted]

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## ECUADOREAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN NEARS THE FINISH LINE

Preparations for Ecuador's presidential and congressional elections on 2 June are proceeding smoothly. Little fraud is expected, and the role of the military probably will be limited to guaranteeing order.

Center-left candidate Andres Cordova continues to gain strength at the expense of the two leading candidates, [redacted] Jose Maria Velasco and conservative Camilo Ponce. Clashes between Velasquistas and center-left supporters are continuing; such violence is a measure both of the closeness of the presidential race and depth of the political passions it has aroused. Rowdy antics of followers of former president Carlos Julio Arosemena, who is supporting Velasco, will probably cost the Velasquista congressional ticket some support, although Carlos Julio is virtually assured of winning a senate seat.

There is some military uneasiness over the possibility that Carlos Julio might go on to win the Senate presidency, which would put only the vice presi-

dent--a nonentity--between him and the presidency. The US Embassy comments that while the military would be reluctant to overthrow a popularly elected Velasco government, it would not take lightly the idea that Arosemena could regain a position of real power.

A total of 1,198,987 citizens--some 21 percent of the population--are registered to vote, and observers expect that approximately 850,000 of them will actually cast their ballots. This would be an increase of 100,000 over the vote in the 1960 presidential elections.

At the request of President Otto Arosemena, the Organization of American States will send a group of observers headed by a Panamanian to monitor the elections. Although the observers could verify that the government's organization and administration of the elections are relatively honest and efficient, they would be in no position to evaluate the principal opposition charge of electoral fraud in terms of voter registration.

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## POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DETERIORATION IN URUGUAY

President Pacheco's prospects for dealing with Uruguay's basic economic problems have been dimmed by a protracted cabinet crisis and by labor agitation.

Although Pacheco managed to form a new cabinet after the old one resigned a month ago, the subsequent resignation of Interior Minister Legnani demonstrated the continued lack of political stability and has sparked rumors of further resignations.

Finance Minister Cesar Charlone now is under attack by Communists and other opposition elements within the legislature because of his identification with the unpopular economic austerity program. Pacheco reportedly will defend him by all constitutional means and has threatened to dissolve Congress and call for new elections if Charlone is forced to resign.

Outside the cabinet, Central Bank President Enrique Iglesias has been severely criticized in government circles for his role in the latest currency devaluation. Charges were made that a

cabinet minister or top bank official leaked advance word of the devaluation to foreign exchange speculators, and Pacheco authorized a Senate investigation.

Although the investigation is not completed, the Senate is attempting to publish a confidential Central Bank Report that would tend to embarrass Iglesias regardless of his guilt or innocence. Press reports continue to speculate that both Iglesias and Charlone will resign.

A dramatic increase in labor agitation is threatening Pacheco's wage stabilization policies. A recent offer to government workers would increase salary expenditures by approximately 20 percent, compared with the 17 percent a representative of the International Monetary Fund had earlier described as the limit the government can afford. Even with the more generous government offer, worker demands have not been met and organized labor may feel that its position is strong enough to hold out for still higher wages and benefits.

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## GOVERNING PARTY WINS DOMINICAN ELECTIONS

President Balaguer's governing Reformist Party (PR) won heavily in last week's municipal elections in the Dominican Republic.

Provisional returns released by the Central Electoral Board show the PR winning in 66 of the 77 municipalities contested. In patronage-rich Santo Domingo the party polled slightly more than 65 percent of the vote, and in the country's second largest city, Santiago, its plurality was over 47 percent. Independent slates topped the balloting in nine contests, and the Social Christians won in two. The left-of-center Dominican Revolutionary Party, which had controlled 13 local governments including Santo Domingo, abstained on grounds that the elections were rigged by the PR.

Slightly over 55 percent of an estimated 1.8 million eligible voters turned out for what has been termed one of the most orderly elections in the nation's history. In the 1966 presidential and congressional elections,

79 percent of the estimated 1.7 million voters went to the polls.

The size of the vote was held down by heavy rains on election day and the local rather than national character of the elections, as well as by the abstention of all opposition parties except the Social Christians.

Reactions to the outcome have included charges of fraud by defeated candidates. Communist elements have interpreted what they call a mediocre turnout as a repudiation of the Balaguer government. The President has described the results as the "worst defeat of the opposition." The Social Christians, however, were cheered by their performance as they quadrupled the vote they received in the 1966 elections.

There were scattered minor incidents of violence, but plans to disrupt the election never materialized, in part because of heavy security precautions.

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